

## **Synonymy and the Limit of Inquiry**

### **Introduction – Wilfrid Sellars’ Unfinished Project**

In “The Identity Approach to the Mind-Body Problem,” Wilfrid Sellars construes the identity theory of mind as a linguistic hypothesis. He argues that raw feels and brain states are identical if raw feel predicates and brain state predicates are “on the move towards a possible synonymy, as was correctly predicted for the predicates of chemical and micro-physical theory” (IAMB §41). That is, although the predicates of current brain state theory do not have the same meanings as raw feel predicates, the predicates of a future or “to-be-developed” brain state theory could—and the identity theory amounts to the prediction that they would. Having laid out this approach to the mind-body problem, Sellars muses that a similar approach could be the foundation for a very specific semantic project. He writes that his “further strategy would be ... to build a bridge to behavioral criteria of synonymy” (IAMB §9). Unfortunately, he does not comment further on what such criteria would look like. He also does not explicitly return to this project in his other works. My goal in this paper, therefore, is to provide a criterion of synonymy of the sort that Sellars may have had in mind—one which is as analogous as possible to the identity theory in IAMB and which is consistent with his other semantic views. To this end, I will argue that two linguistic or conceptual items are synonymous if they have the same “successor” in the representational system we would adopt at the limit of inquiry.

In Section One, I will lay terminological groundwork by explaining Sellars’ account of functional roles and providing definitions of “successor” and “ultimate successor.” I will also

argue that the meanings of linguistic and conceptual items partially depends on their successors, and that a linguistic or conceptual item has at most one ultimate successor. In Section Two, I will outline Sellars' semantic views and propose a criterion of synonymy based on shared ultimate successors. In Section Three, I will address potential difficulties for my criterion having to do with a) linguistic or conceptual items that may have no ultimate successors, b) the role of context in synonymy relations, and c) Quine's arguments against the existence of a uniquely ideal representational system. In my conclusion, I will discuss the relevance of Chalmers' theory of intensions and Peirce's theory of signs for broadening the scope of my project.

Before I begin, I should note that when I refer to a "linguistic or conceptual item" (or simply "item") my intention is to refer to a bearer or vehicle of meaning while remaining neutral on what kind of thing it is or to what sort of representational system it belongs. An item could be a word, predicate, concept, or any other element of a representational system so long as it a) has a functional role (see below) and b) is a simple expression. By simple expressions, I mean those elements of a representational system whose meanings are given by its lexical semantics alone (see Szabó 1.1). For example, the words "red" and "cat" are simple expressions in English, but the complex expression "red cat" is not. It is certainly possible for complex expressions to stand in relations of synonymy, but until my conclusion I will be limiting my discussion to relations of synonymy where both relata are simple expressions.

## **I. Functional Roles, Successors, and Ultimate Successors**

The meaning of an item, according to Sellars, is its functional role. An item's functional role is the system of behavioral propensities associated with the use of that item. Sellars divides

these propensities into three main types, corresponding to our cognitive capacities for perception, inference, and volition respectively. Propensities of the first type are propensities to “language-entry transitions,” the linguistic and conceptual acts we perform in response to relevant perceptual states (such as uttering or thinking “Lo, a rabbit!” upon seeing a rabbit). Propensities of the second type are propensities to “intra-linguistic transitions,” the inferences we make when confronted with relevant evidence or information (such as forming the belief that a rabbit is nearby upon discovering there are footprints of a certain shape on the ground). Propensities of the third type are propensities to “language-exit transitions,” the non-representational acts we perform subsequent to relevant linguistic and conceptual acts (such as running towards a rabbit after uttering or thinking “I will now chase that rabbit”). Though grasping the meaning of an item comes in many gradations, Sellars believes that doing so at all requires a person to acquire relevant propensities of all three types.

I want to distinguish a fourth type of propensity that I take to be part of the functional role of an item, one which corresponds to our cognitive capacity for revising our representational systems. These propensities are to what I shall call “language-refinement transitions” (LRTs), or the changes we make to the functional roles of items when confronted with relevant evidence or information. LRTs are similar to intra-linguistic transitions. However, realizing that a rabbit is nearby from footprints of a certain shape would not change the way we use “rabbit.” Realizing that rabbits are mammals or that rabbits are a source of food, on the other hand, *would* change the way we use “rabbit.” As with the other types of propensities, acquiring relevant propensities to LRTs is necessary for grasping the meaning of an item. This is because learning to use an item in even an unsophisticated manner requires sensitivity to the sorts of evidence or information—

including the training and criticism of one's linguistic community—that ought to positively or negatively reinforce its use in various sorts of situations.

I am now in a position to define successors and ultimate successors. A successor of X is an item which would result from the LRTs we would perform on X if we were to be confronted with additional information. The ultimate successor of X is the item which would result from the LRTs we would perform on X if we were to be confronted with *exhaustive* information and if we were *ideally rational*.

An ideally rational being (or community) is one with the ability to submit an arbitrary amount of information to analysis (see Chalmers' discussion of Laplacean intellects, CW xiii) and the inclination to perform LRTs in a way which makes its representational system maximally useful—e.g., conducive to efficient thought, communication, and inquiry. By exhaustive information, I mean information satisfying Chalmers' definition of a “scrutability base”—a class of truths from which all truths are scrutable (CW 20). An ideally rational being confronted with exhaustive information would be in a position to know all truths and would be inclined to systematize these truths in the most useful or efficient way possible. The limit of inquiry, as I shall use the term, is the point at which an ideally rational being confronted with exhaustive information would have no further reason to perform LRTs on any of the items in its representational system. The ideal representational system, accordingly, is the representational system we would adopt were we ever to reach the limit of inquiry, and ultimate successors are successors which belong to the lexicon of this representational system.

I will return in Section Three to Quine's objections to the notion of a determinate representational system we would adopt at the limit of inquiry, and also to the problem that the

“usefulness” of a representational system may be relative to context. At the moment, however, these are the two points which matter:

First, the meaning of an item partially depends on its successors and *a fortiori* its ultimate successor. This is because an item’s meaning is its functional role, and part of an item’s functional role is how that functional role is disposed to evolve. The range of possible meanings that an item could come to have (i.e., the meanings of its successors) is in this sense already contained in its meaning. Sellars seems to have this idea in mind when he writes that “at any one time the terms in a theory will carry with them as part of their logical force that which it is reasonable to envisage as the manner of their integration” into future theories and that “their roles as candidates for integration in the ‘total picture’ ... are part of the logic, and hence the meaning, of theoretical terms” (EPM §55). The reason this is important is that synonymy relations should presumably hold between items in virtue of their meanings, and in Section Two I will propose a criterion of synonymy based on shared ultimate successors. Such a criterion would be absurd on its face if sharing successors in common were not a way that two items could share part of their meaning in common.

Second, an item has at most one ultimate successor, which is why I have been referring to *the* ultimate successor of an item. As we will see in Section Two, the uniqueness of ultimate successors is important in order to avoid indeterminate or partial relations of synonymy. An item might have a variety of successors simpliciter—both because it is possible to perform irrational LRTs and because it is possible to perform different rational LRTs depending on the particular information that happens to confront us—but these possibilities are excluded by the definition of an ultimate successor. As Chalmers argues, “changes of mind about a fully specified scenario

will always involve either a failure of ideal reasoning or a change in meaning” (CW 209). If we are confronted with exhaustive information and are ideally rational, there is only one set of facts to consider (all of them) and no possibility of performing irrational LRTs. Moreover, LRTs by definition only change the meanings of items already in a representational system—they do not introduce new items. This is why cases of linguistic or conceptual “fission” do not add to the number of successors or ultimate successors that an item has. When someone learns to make the conceptual distinction between gold and fool’s gold, for example, only the refined concept of gold is a successor of the original concept of gold. The concept of fool’s gold, in contrast, is a new concept entirely.

I now turn to Sellars’ semantic views and the details of IAMB in order to clarify the desiderata for a Sellars-inspired criterion of synonymy.

## **II. Meaning Statements and Synonymy Statements**

According to Sellars, “to say someone has the concept of snow is to say that she has a •snow• available in her idiolect” (DV 151). Dot-quoted expressions like •snow• are what he calls “metalinguistic sortals” or “illustrating functional sortals”—common nouns that are true of any linguistic or conceptual item that has the same functional role as the item enclosed within the dot-quotes. On Sellars’ view, “the meaning of an expression is its ‘use’ (in the sense of function), in that to say what an expression means is to classify it by means of an illustrating functional sortal” (MFC 431). He therefore interprets a meaning statement like (1) as (2):

- (1) “Rot” (in German) means red

(2) “Rot”s (in German) are •red•s

Meaning statements like (2) are shorthand. Although it would be possible in principle to explain the meaning of “rot” to an English speaker by enumerating all of the semantic rules governing its use in German, it would not be practical. It suffices under ordinary circumstances to illustrate the meaning of an item with a metalinguistic sortal, because this technique “provides a way of mobilizing our linguistic intuitions to classify expressions in terms of functions which we would find it difficult if not practically impossible to spell out in terms of explicit rules” (MFC 432). For Sellars, the meaning statement (2) entails—but cannot be reduced to—the synonymy statement (3):

(3) “Rot” plays in German the same role as “red” plays in English

Unfortunately, Sellars does not analyze synonymy statements like (3) much further. The main objective of his semantic theory is to naturalize intentionality; having done so, he is content to leave vague what it means for two items to have the *same* functional role. He acknowledges that in most cases, strictly speaking, putative synonyms do not mean exactly the same thing—as it is no more plausible that “rot” and “red” currently have the very same functional role than it is that raw feel predicates and brain state predicates do—but he is unperturbed because synonymy statements “are to be construed as having a tacit rider to the effect that the correspondence is in a relevant respect and obtains to a relevant degree” (TC 35). I agree that context is a factor in determining the relevant *respect* of correspondence between functional roles (a subject I will discuss further in Section Three), and I agree that it should be possible for two items to be

synonyms even if they do not have exactly the same functional role, but I do not think our criterion of synonymy should appeal to relevant *degrees* of correspondence between functional roles at all. This is because in IAMB it is not sufficient for the identity of raw feels and brain states if the predicates of a to-be-developed brain state theory turn out to be very similar in function to raw feel predicates. Instead, Sellars' identity theory requires that "among the universals which would find expression in the predicates of a to-be-developed 'brain state' theory, *some are identical* with 'raw feel' universals" (IAMB §16, emphasis mine). To preserve parallelism with IAMB, we should avoid the vagueness of correspondence "to a relevant degree" and base our criterion of synonymy on shared successors instead.

To further preserve parallelism with IAMB, we should base our criterion of synonymy specifically on shared ultimate successors rather than on shared successors simpliciter. Granted, Sellars never explicitly states that raw feel predicates and brain state predicates are on the move towards synonymy at the limit of inquiry or within the ideal representational system. It would, however, be a truly bizarre form of physicalism that asserted that brain state predicates are on the move towards synonymy with raw feel predicates only temporarily or only within some or other of our to-be-developed scientific theories. Moreover, Sellars writes that his talk of to-be-developed predicates and the universals they express "might be construed in a Peircean way as relative to the continuing scientific community" (IAMB §15). I take it, therefore, that there is a claim about ultimate successors implicit in his identity theory. Making our criterion of synonymy reflect this claim does not set too high of a standard, for we have at least as good reason to predict the convergence of items like "rot" and "red" in any would-be Peircean Esperanto as we



have to predict the convergence of raw feel predicates and brain state predicates in the ideal scientific theory.

Technically, as noted above, Sellars' identity theory only requires that *some* of the universals expressed by future brain state predicates are identical to those expressed by raw feel predicates. An analogue of the "some" qualification, however, should not be included in our criterion of synonymy. It only appears in IAMB because Sellars is theorizing about the reduction of raw feels as a category to brain states as a category, not about the identity of any particular raw feels and brain states. It is perfectly consistent with this categorial reduction for there to be some future brain state predicates that have nothing to do with raw feel predicates, and we should expect as much given that the aims of neurobiology go beyond explaining our sensations. If individual items have at most one ultimate successor each, however, there can be no point in saying that two items need only share *some* of the same ultimate successors in order to be synonymous.

I submit, in light of these various considerations, that the synonymy statement (3) should be interpreted as (4):

(3) "Rot" plays in German the same role as "red" plays in English

(4) The ultimate successor of "rot" is the same as the ultimate successor of "red"

Synonymy relations, of course, do not only obtain between the elements of different representational systems. For example, "boat" and "ship" in English are synonyms even though "ship" tends to be used for larger watercraft. The above analysis supports this intuition, because it seems unlikely that the boat-ship distinction would continue to be useful at the limit of inquiry.

It is reasonable to suppose that “boat” and “ship” have the same ultimate successor so long as it is reasonable to suppose that these items have ultimate successors in the first place (a question I will take up in Section Three). Stating the analysis which interprets (3) as (4) in the form of a general criterion yields (S):

(S) For any two linguistic or conceptual items X and Y, X and Y are synonymous if the ultimate successor of X is the same as the ultimate successor of Y

It is, of course, one thing to analyze synonymy in a way parallel to Sellars’ analysis of identity in IAMB and quite another to assess the coherence or plausibility of this analysis. The former has been the primary purpose of this paper—which is why, for example, I have not questioned Sellars’ reduction of meaning to behavioral propensities—but I now turn to some of the difficulties that (S) faces even on its own terms. For (S) to be plausible will require a few qualifications and clarifications.

### **III. Difficulties for (S)**

The first difficulty for (S) is that if the lexicon of the ideal representational system contains too few items, (S) is too difficult to satisfy. There are two sides to this difficulty. On the one hand, it may seem that very few of the items in our current scientific theories have ultimate successors if fundamental ontology is limited, for example, to elementary particles and basic forces. On the other hand, it may seem that there would be no use for any phenomenal or commonsense items like “boat” and “ship” in the ideal representational system. I stated that it is reasonable to suppose that “boat” and “ship” have the same ultimate successor, but is it not more

reasonable to suppose that such mundane items will eventually be rendered obsolete by scientific progress and so have no ultimate successor at all?

The answer to the latter side of this difficulty for (S) is to distinguish between the ideal scientific ontology and the ideal practical ontology, both of which would be part of the ideal representational system. An ontology of imperceptible particles and forces may indeed supersede an ontology of sensations, macroscopic objects, and free agents in matters of causal explanation and our ontological commitments as philosophers, but there is no reason to think that an ontology of the second kind will ever cease to be useful for more mundane tasks. Moreover, the great usefulness of natural languages for communication and inquiry—though far from ideal—suggests that the ideal practical ontology will not differ from our current practical ontologies in radical or fundamental ways. Any would-be Peircean Esperanto is likely to consolidate items with functional roles as similar as “boat” and “ship,” but it is unlikely to reshape the overall lexical contours we find in natural languages. As DeVries puts it, “in view of its role in the acquisition of empirical knowledge, there is no reason to think that further empirical investigation will radically change ... the vocabulary of the sensibles” (DV 226).

The answer to the former side of this difficulty for (S) is to point out that the ultimate successors of the elements of our current scientific theories are not limited to items which are fundamental, i.e. those which are necessary and sufficient for an exhaustive scientific description of the world. Inquiry is not always aimed at the construction of a minimum vocabulary or the carving of nature at its joints. On the contrary, inquiry has reached its limit only when there could be no further reason to perform LRTs, and there is reason to perform LRTs at least so long as it is possible to simplify and compress our scientific description of the world. Chalmers argues

that “it is not obvious that a maximally compressed description [of the world] will itself be a specification of metaphysically fundamental or conceptually primitive truths” (CW 347), and I would add that the usefulness of the special sciences furnishes us with strong inductive reason to believe otherwise. Even if we assume that all of the special sciences are reducible to fundamental physics, it remains the case that a biology textbook written exclusively with the vocabulary of fundamental physics would quickly become baroque beyond all reason (to say nothing of a psychology or ecology textbook). The more empirical success is attributable to the use of an item, the more reason we have to believe that it has an ultimate successor—and this remains true even if we also have reason to believe that definitional equivalents of its ultimate successor could be constructed out of the ultimate successors of other items. Sellars writes that “different conceptual strata can, and indeed do, co-exist in our ordinary experience of the world” (SK 1.4.25), but it is also the case that different conceptual strata can—and indeed should—co-exist in our scientific description of the world.

The second difficulty for (S) is, in a sense, the opposite: if the lexicon of the ideal representational system contains too *many* items, (S) is also too difficult to satisfy. Very few of the items in our current representational systems have ultimate successors in common if, instead of tending towards the convergence of similar items, the evolution of language tends in the long run towards an extravagant proliferation of linguistic and/or conceptual distinctions. Arguably this has not been the tendency of linguistic evolution through human history so far, but DeVries believes that the ideal representational system would “enable the construction of arbitrarily fine-grained pictures of the world” (DV 275). If he is correct, an extravagant proliferation of linguistic and/or conceptual distinctions may indeed be required in the future.

The answer to this second difficulty for (S) is to take into consideration the role of context in synonymy statements. The ideal representational system may be one which would enable the construction of arbitrarily fine-grained pictures of the world, but DeVries also believes that it is one which would enable the construction of pictures of “arbitrarily delimited realms of reality” (DV 270). Arbitrary delimitation goes far beyond the phenomenal/scientific divide that I have already discussed. A “realm” could be a spatial region, temporal period, linguistic community, objective, or any other delimitation of the world implied by the context surrounding the assertion of a synonymy statement. We can qualify the definition of an ultimate successor accordingly: the ultimate successor of X is the item resulting from the LRTs we would perform on X if we were to be confronted with exhaustive information *about the realm in question* and if we were ideally rational. On this definition, any of an item’s successors could be its ultimate successor with respect to a sufficiently narrow or gerrymandered realm. Context thus determines *which* of an item’s successors is its ultimate successor for purposes of satisfying (S), which is what I meant in Section Two when I wrote that context is a factor in determining the relevant *respect*, though not *degree*, of correspondence between two items. The reason this is important is that the ideal representational system for a particular context may be very different—and its lexicon far more granular—than the ideal representational system for the world as a whole. The narrower the realm in question, the less likely the ideal representational system for it requires an extravagant proliferation of linguistic and/or conceptual distinctions, and the less likely two items fail to satisfy (S) on account of such a proliferation. Moreover, an item such as “phlogiston” may have an ultimate successor *only* relative to a particular realm such as pre-modern chemistry, in which case the qualified definition of an ultimate successor would be

necessary to make sense (for example) of the synonymy of “phlogiston” in the lexicon of a pre-modern English chemist with an equivalent item in the lexicon of a pre-modern German chemist.

The third and final difficulty for (S) that I will consider has to do with the potential indeterminacy of ultimate successors, even after we have relativized them to context. Quine asserts that “we have no reason to suppose that man’s surface irritations even unto eternity admit of any one systematization that is scientifically better or simpler than all possible others” and that “in general the simplest possible theory to a given purpose need not be unique” (WO §6). If there is no fact of the matter about the ultimate successor of an item, there can be no fact of the matter about its relations of synonymy with other items either.

There are two main options for responding to this difficulty. The first is to appeal to Chalmers’ various arguments that “there are facts about what subjects should say or about what ideal reasoning dictates” (CW 209), but I do not have the space to do these arguments justice. The second is to make the following qualification to (S):

(S\*) For any two linguistic or conceptual items X and Y, X and Y are synonymous if *there is good reason to believe that* the ultimate successor of X is the same as the ultimate successor of Y

Sellars’ identity theory, after all, only claims that raw feel predicates and brain state predicates are on the move towards a *possible* synonymy and that the trajectory of scientific progress gives us good reason to believe this synonymy will turn out to be actual. We can understand “good reason to believe” in two different senses. The first sense is purely epistemic: the evidence we have points in a sufficient degree towards X and Y having the same ultimate successor. The second sense is methodological: the hypothesis that X and Y have the same

ultimate successor is useful for refining our linguistic practices in much the same way that the identity theory of mind is useful for guiding our inquiry into neurobiology. Either sense we give (S\*) is consistent with Sellars' identity theory, but the second sense is preferable. This is because Quine would argue, for example, that there is no more evidence for "gavagai" in a jungle native's language being synonymous with "rabbit" in English than there is for its being synonymous with "temporal slice of a rabbit" or "undetached rabbit parts" in English (WO §§7-12). Sellars and many others take exception to Quine's arguments for the indeterminacy of radical translation, but there is no need to re-litigate these cumbersome debates if we give (S\*) the methodological sense instead of the epistemic sense. The indeterminacy arguments, even if successful, in no way undermine the rationality of *entertaining* the "rabbit" hypothesis over the "undetached rabbit parts" hypothesis for the purpose of facilitating further inquiry into the language of the jungle native. As Quine himself acknowledges, "however inconclusive the methods [of the field linguist], they generate a *working hypothesis*" (WO §7, emphasis mine).

### **Conclusion – Chalmers' Intensions and Peirce's Interpretants**

As stated in my introduction, I have restricted my discussion to relations of synonymy where both relata are simple expressions. Having proposed an IAMB-inspired criterion of synonymy for such relations, and having defended it against preliminary difficulties, I want to relax this restriction. I will now briefly consider how the limit of inquiry might, consistently with Sellars' semantic views, play a role in a *compositional* semantic project—one which would give us a criterion of synonymy for complex expressions.

The reason why (S) does not work for complex expressions is straightforward: complex expressions do not have successors, and *a fortiori* do not have ultimate successors. This is because complex expressions are not subject to LRTs in the way that simple expressions are. The principle of compositionality, which Szabó describes as “a fundamental presupposition of most contemporary work in semantics,” states that “the meaning of a complex expression is fully determined by its structure and the meanings of its constituents” (Szabó intro.). Accordingly, a change in the meaning of a complex expression can only occur due to either a change in the meaning of one of its constituent parts or a change in the syntactic rules of the representational system to which it belongs, not due to LRTs performed on the complex expression itself.

While complex expressions do not have ultimate successors, they can have what Peirce calls “dynamic objects” and “final interpretants.” Peirce is better known for defining truth in terms of the limit of inquiry, but in his late philosophy he also incorporates the limit of inquiry into his theory of signification. The dynamic object of a sign or expression is its extension, more or less—what it signifies, independently of how anyone prior to the limit of inquiry interprets it. The final interpretant of a sign or expression is how we would understand its dynamic object at the limit of inquiry. The crucial difference between a final interpretant and an ultimate successor is that a final interpretant corresponds to an idealized judgement about the extension of an expression *at the time of its use*, rather than to the meaning of an expression *as it would ideally be used*. The final interpretant of an expression, therefore, does not depend in any way on its successors, meaning that both simple and complex expressions can have final interpretants.

Because Sellars does not identify the meaning of an expression with its extension (even in part), a criterion of synonymy for complex expressions based on shared dynamic objects



would not work. The behavioral propensities associated with the use of an expression may determine its extension, but an expression's extension is not itself part of the functional role—and thus meaning—of said expression. A criterion of synonymy for complex expressions based on shared final interpretants, on the other hand, could work. This is because the final interpretant of an expression, like an ultimate successor, is definable in terms of behavioral propensities—namely, the dispositions to judgements about the extensions of expressions that we would have at the limit of inquiry. In fact, in *Constructing the World*, Chalmers provides a criterion of synonymy based on “idealized intensions” which are virtually indistinguishable from Peirce’s final interpretants. Following Carnap’s theory of intensions in “Meaning and Synonymy in Natural Languages,” Chalmers defines the intension of an expression as “a function that maps possible cases to the extension that the speaker is disposed to identify when presented with that case” (CW 205). He then develops an idealized version of Carnap’s intensions: “instead of appealing to what the subject *would* say in response to the case, we appeal to what the subject ideally *should* say” (CW 209). The idealized intension of an expression, therefore, is “a function from scenarios to extensions, *mirroring speakers’ idealized judgments about the extension of the expression in the scenario*” (CW 16, emphasis mine). Two expressions are synonymous, for Chalmers, if they have the same idealized intension.

I do not have the space to evaluate the plausibility of such a criterion in any detail. The pressing question, however, is this: if a criterion for complex expressions based on shared final interpretants or idealized intensions were to work, then why—apart from loyalty to Sellars’ strategy in IAMB—should we not apply the same criterion to simple expressions, replacing (S)?

My answer is that it is far more difficult for two expressions to have the same final interpretant or idealized intension than it is for two expressions to have the same ultimate successor. “Boat” and “ship,” for example, probably do *not* have the same idealized intension. Due to the differences in their current use by English speakers, we would probably—even at the limit of inquiry—judge some objects such as canoes and aircraft carriers to be in the extension of one and not the other. If we want to support the pre-theoretic intuition that items like “boat” and “ship” are synonyms, having the same final interpretant or idealized intension is simply too high of a standard. Furthermore, it should not surprise us if the standards of synonymy for complex expressions are higher than the standards of synonymy for simple expressions. This is because the granularity of the meanings expressible by complex expressions vastly exceeds the granularity of the meanings expressible by simple expressions. It is typically much harder, for example, to faithfully translate a whole sentence of one language into another than it is to faithfully translate individual words.

It is perhaps no coincidence, then, that Sellars muses in IAMB about building a bridge to behavioral *criteria* of synonymy rather than a behavioral *criterion* of synonymy. In any case, I hope to have brought this bridge one step nearer to completion.

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